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ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND THE SOCIAL LEGITIMACY
OF CLASS ACTIONS
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In response to Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too
Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2010).
Do class action lawyers make too little? For many, one might as
well inquire into the Pope’s religious affiliation, or whether the Cubs
have a chance at winning the World Series. To Brian Fitzpatrick,
however, the conventional answer—no—is wrong. In an arresting article, he makes a utilitarian argument for why plaintiffs’ lawyers often
should receive a much higher share of a class’s recovery than they pre1
sently do.
Fitzpatrick contends with justification that courts lack a normative
2
metric to determine attorneys’ fees in class actions. Unprincipled fee
awards trouble him because he believes that courts systematically undercompensate plaintiffs’ lawyers in “small-stakes” class suits in which
each class member has “only a few dollars or a few hundred dollars” in
3
potential damages. These cases do not really compensate anyone,
Fitzpatrick argues, since minor per capita recoveries for class members
4
5
create no social utility. Their only function is deterrence. If 100%
†

Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.
I am grateful for Brian Fitzpatrick’s patient and valuable reactions to this Response.
1
See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2043, 2046 (2010) (invoking a “social-welfarist utilitarian perspective”).
2
Id. at 2053.
3
Id. at 2067.
4
Fitzpatrick’s argument hinges on the claim that compensatory damages function
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of the class’s recovery went to counsel as fees, lawyers would have the
greatest possible incentive to bring small-stakes class actions. Maximum deterrence would result at no cost to class member utility. Fee
6
percentages, however, typically hover around 25%. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
thus eschew a possibly meritorious case when its expected litigation
costs exceed 25% of its expected aggregate value. Potentially valuable
7
deterrence never materializes from these (mostly quite small) cases. If
the entire recovery in these small-stakes suits went to class counsel, courts
could minimize this suboptimal result.
Fitzpatrick writes so lucidly that his article’s many strengths speak
for themselves. His discussion of the functions that small-stakes class
suits do and do not play is particularly interesting, and he elegantly
pivots from this analysis to his utilitarian case for higher fees. But
questions remain. Does existing doctrine permit courts to award the
class’s entire recovery to class counsel? Has Fitzpatrick made a sufficient utilitarian case for his proposal? Is utilitarianism the best normative guide for fee awards in aggregate litigation? In my opinion,
the answer to each is no.
I. DOCTRINAL DIFFICULTIES
Does existing law permit courts to award counsel 100% of the
class’s recovery? Fitzpatrick does not frame the issue quite this way.
He acknowledges that such awards might be legally difficult to render,
and in the end recommends that lawyers earn “as much as legal and
8
political constraints permit.” But whether 100% fee awards are doctrinally possible is a useful question for two reasons. First, although
as a form of insurance. Id. at 2058. Because individuals are not risk averse with respect
to small losses, they would not purchase insurance to protect against such losses. Id. at
2067-68. As I understand the logic, because these individuals would not purchase insurance ex ante, there is no gain in social utility if they receive the equivalent ex post
in the form of damages.
5
Id. at 2068.
6
Id. at 2046.
7
One hundred thousand dollar fee requests are not difficult to find. E.g., Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 492 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (approving a
$100,000 fee request when the proposed settlement for the class equaled $300,000);
Hopson v. Hansebrands Inc., No. 08-0844, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8,
2008) (conditionally certifying a settlement class under terms including “up to
$100,000 maximum . . . to attorney fees”). Taking this figure as the minimum a plaintiffs’ lawyer needs to expect in order to file a class action, Fitzpatrick’s proposal would
incentivize lawyers to file cases worth less than $400,000 (25% of which is $100,000)
and cases worth more than $400,000 but involving unusually high litigation expenses.
8
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2079 (emphasis omitted).
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his focus is primarily theoretical, Fitzpatrick does suggest, albeit guar9
dedly, that applicable law might permit such fees. Second, if existing
doctrine permits only a partial implementation of Fitzpatrick’s proposal, then the theoretical rigor his analysis promises for fee awards
loses some of its luster.
Fitzpatrick addresses several doctrinal challenges to his proposal,
10
but two merit more examination than he provides. The Rules Enabl11
ing Act (REA) poses the first challenge. Fitzpatrick believes that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), which licenses “reasonable” fee
12
13
awards in class actions, permits courts to do what he urges. But the
REA prohibits rules of procedure that “abridge, enlarge or modify any
14
substantive right,” and this limitation might preclude an interpretation of “reasonable” to include such all-encompassing fee awards. An
order giving the lawyer everything would effectively assign class members’ claims to their counsel without their consent. Doctrine that re15
gulates claim assignment is substantive law, and the Federal Rules
16
themselves may not modify these assignments. Although the issue is
17
quite complicated, Rule 23(h) might violate the REA’s substantive
rights limitation if applied in the manner Fitzpatrick desires.
9

See id. at 2076 (arguing that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“might permit judges to award fees as high as they wish”); id. at 2077 (analyzing statutory fee caps and concluding that “it is not clear that these caps would prevent judges
from awarding fees consistent with deterrence-insurance theory”); id. at 2077-78 (reviewing the Erie-Hanna doctrinal implications of state statutory fee caps and suggesting
why Rule 23 might preempt them).
10
Fitzpatrick mentions the unjust enrichment issue briefly. Id. at 2075 (noting
that “the common law of unjust enrichment . . . might not permit” 100% fee awards).
11
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077 (2006).
12
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
13
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2047-48, 2075-76 (noting that a 100% fee award
could be permissible if state-law caps are preempted, and could be considered reasonable in light of the broad discretion vested in district court judges in approving fee awards).
14
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
15
See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83 (4th
Cir. 1973) (“Whether a plaintiff is entitled to enforce the asserted right is determined
according to the substantive law.”); Payne v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., No. 08-0199, 2008 WL
4890764, at *1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2008) (same); 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1545 (4th ed. 2010)
(theorizing that substantive law relating to the assignment of claims is the basis for the
real-party-in-interest rule).
16
See Stichting Ter Behartiging Van De Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het
Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber, 407 F.3d 34, 49 n.14 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The
procedural mechanisms set forth in Rule 17(a) for ameliorating real party in interest
problems may not, under the Rules Enabling Act, be employed to expand substantive
rights.” (citation omitted)).
17
For example, it is uncertain whether as-applied challenges to the Federal Rules
are permitted. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity,
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Second, the doctrinal source for class counsel fees might not allow
Fitzpatrick’s proposal. Concerns of unjust enrichment—or the fear
that class members would enjoy a windfall at an attorney’s expense—
justify courts using their equitable power to tax a class’s recovery for
18
fees. This “common fund” doctrine allows fees when “the classes of
persons benefited by the lawsuits ‘[are] small in number and easily
identifiable,’” when “‘[t]he benefits [can] be traced with some accuracy,” and when “‘there [is] reason for confidence that the costs [of
litigation can] indeed be shifted with some exactitude to those bene19
fiting.’”
A class action that makes no pretense of compensation
might deter, but society at large, not just class members, would enjoy
20
better defendant behavior in the future as a result. A case without a
small and readily identifiable class of beneficiaries, and featuring only
the “vindicat[ion of] a general social grievance,” could not legitimate21
ly result in a fee award.
Fitzpatrick criticizes the “indeterminate multifactor test[s]” courts
22
presently use to calculate fees as unprincipled, and in contrast he offers a normative justification for a 100% fee award. But if the REA or
unjust enrichment problems would require some significant downward departure from this percentage, I question whether courts using
23
his utilitarian analysis and giving lawyers “as much as they can” would
in the end award fees in any more theoretically robust a manner.

and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing how the Supreme Court left the question open in Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010)).
18
See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“[T]his Court has recognized consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the
benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s
fee from the fund as a whole.”).
19
Id. at 478-79 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S.
240, 263-67 & n.39 (1975)); cf. Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 790 (6th Cir. 2004)
(interpreting Van Gemert for the requirement that a case must “result in the creation of
a fund to be divvied up among the plaintiffs” to justify a fee award).
20
Deterrence likely would not be readily quantifiable and thus could not justify a
fee award. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 974 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
because the value of injunctive relief is difficult to quantify, it can only rarely be included in common fund calculations).
21
Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 479.
22
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2053.
23
Id. at 2083.
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II. UTILITARIAN PROBLEMS
Has Fitzpatrick made a sufficient utilitarian case for his proposal?
I have two doubts. First, fee awards of the ilk Fitzpatrick prefers might
cause a net deterrence loss. His proposal would apply in all cases in24
volving minor per capita recoveries. But a case’s aggregate value determines whether the game is worth the candle for the plaintiffs’ lawyer. As a recent case illustrates, potential damages of three dollars per
class member would hardly thwart litigation if the case as a whole
25
Fitzpatrick’s proposal might produce a
might win $9.5 million.
greatly diminished settlement in this sort of case. Presently, if an attorney wants $2.5 million in fees, she must obtain a $10 million settlement. But if the lawyer gets 100% of the recovery, a $2.5 million
settlement would earn her the same amount. The defendant could
take advantage of class counsel’s higher rate of return and discount a
settlement offer by $7.5 million. A risk-averse plaintiffs’ lawyer might
accept such an offer, and there are reasons to think that risk aversion
26
would be likely in this context. Whatever additional deterrence the
eschewed $7.5 million might have created vanishes. The small cases
Fitzpatrick’s proposal would generate might engender some deterrence, but I am not sure it would counterbalance this loss.
I also doubt that Fitzpatrick has made the utilitarian case for more
lawsuits. The expectation of larger fees might fuel litigation, and with
it, the more robust enforcement of the substantive law. A utilitarian
would applaud this result only if, to quote Fitzpatrick, “the substantive
law correctly assesses damages for the claims on which small-stakes
27
class actions are based.” The obvious problem is that the substantive
28
law might not optimally deter litigation. But Fitzpatrick argues that
this concern should not militate against his proposal. If full enforcement of the substantive law does not maximize utility, “the proper response” is not to deter litigation with inadequate attorney compensa-

24

See id. at 2066 (embracing the idea that “courts should not lower fee percentages no matter how large the aggregate class recovery may be”).
25
See Class Action Settlement Agreement at 31, In re Classmates.com Consolidated Litig. (W.D. Wash. Mar. 12, 2010) (No. 09-0045), available at
http://www.cmemailsettlement.com/sa.pdf.
26
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 390-91 (2000) (discussing
the diminishing marginal utility of class counsel compensation).
27
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2070.
28
See id. at 2071 (noting that overdeterrence may result if the substantive law does
not accurately assesses damages).
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tion but “to confront [the] problem directly by changing the substan29
tive law.”
Fitzpatrick distinguishes too rigidly between substance and procedure. His idea seems to be that, once a right exists in the substantive
law, all nonsubstantive (or procedural, to use the term expansively)
30
barriers to its full vindication are pathological. Put more weakly, the
idea is that the substantive law has sole responsibility for optimizing
social utility.
But, as a descriptive matter, social utility does not fall so exclusively in the substantive law’s bailiwick. Governments regularly use procedural devices to fine-tune the regulatory force of the substantive
31
law. Indeed, legislatures may well create substantive rights with an
appreciation for the nonsubstantive barriers and facilitators that help
32
determine their real-world impact. At the least, this claim is no less
plausible than the contestable notion that the substantive law itself
33
strives to maximize social utility. If both claims are true, then an onslaught of small-stakes class actions sparked by the sudden decision to
quadruple attorneys fees would significantly distort the intended regulatory effect of the substantive law and the optimal deterrence it ostensibly seeks. As a normative matter, I know of no convincing argu-

29

Id.
Fitzpatrick’s late colleague, Richard Nagareda, thoroughly expounded upon
this idea. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1888 (2006) (discussing the concerns around settlement pressure arising from substantive law).
31
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1450 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that states traditionally refine substantive
law through the use of procedure). For example, at least twenty-three states have laws
that restrict the use of class actions to enforce particular rights. See Brief for Respondent at app. B., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (No. 08-1008) (listing the
state statutes limiting the availability of class actions). In addition, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, (1991), provides for jury trials and shifts
the expert witness costs of a prevailing plaintiff to the defendant in order to enhance
the regulatory effect of Title VII. See Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private
Litigants: Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-12
(2009) (describing the procedural changes that Congress enacted as a direct response
to a line of cases that had narrowed the scope of substantive rights conferred by the
statute). One could easily multiply the examples.
32
See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity
and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1929 (2006) (noting that legislatures frequently are aware of the procedural background against which they legislate).
33
But see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 283 (1988) (summarizing
the public-choice critique of legislation).
30
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ment for why the achievement of optimal utility cannot depend in
some measure on nonsubstantive barriers and facilitators.
If responsibility for social utility does indeed lie both with the
substantive law and the complex of nonsubstantive forces that affect
its implementation, then the argument that plaintiffs’ lawyers should
have the maximum incentive possible to litigate all potential class suits
needs more utilitarian grounding. Fitzpatrick must at least explain
why financial disincentives to litigate class actions should not help determine the optimal level of deterrence.
III. PROBLEMS WITH UTILITARIANISM
Does utilitarianism provide the proper normative metric for fee
34
awards? An alternative metric, rooted in the perceived social legitimacy of the class action, can justify existing practices and better protect the class-suit device against attempts to enervate or destroy it.
If plaintiff compensation in small-stakes class suits is worthless,
then the current fee-award doctrine resembles other aspects of class
action law that burden cases with costs and yield little benefit. These
aspects include, for example, the individual notice and opt-out re35
quirements in small-stakes money damages class suits. The requirement that a class action have a named plaintiff is also arguably point36
less from a cost-benefit perspective.
If one assumes that these ostensibly inefficient requirements perform some valid function, they challenge utilitarianism as a complete
normative guide for the law of aggregate litigation. Letting a case
proceed without a named plaintiff likely would not change its out37
come and hence would not affect any deterrence value it might have.
34

Fitzpatrick rightly acknowledges that the persuasiveness of his proposal hinges
upon whether one shares his utilitarian outlook. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2058.
35
For a discussion of notice, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1991). For a discussion of optout rights, see David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions:
Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 35-46. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance
and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 367-68 (discussing the
“limited utility” of opt-out rights in suits with low-value claims).
36
See Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in
Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 165-66 (1990) (arguing that the elimination of the
named-plaintiff requirement would improve consistency and encourage courts to focus
on the real issues in aggregate litigation).
37
The named plaintiff in a small-stakes class suit has little incentive to monitor
class counsel. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 35, at 5, 19-20 (describing the systemic and practical barriers to a lead plaintiff’s ability to monitor effectively under
these circumstances); Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitor-
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But a spate of clientless cases would underscore the charge, quite detrimental to the class action’s social legitimacy, that class litigation
38
enriches lawyers and does nothing for class members. Money damages suits without opt-out rights might imperil the device similarly.
The recent experience of cases settling for coupons illustrates how
an asymmetric distribution of the recovery between class members
39
The
and their counsel can create problems of social legitimacy.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), part of which addressed
such distributions, has been the most significant legislative attack on
class actions since their recreation in 1966. Prior to its enactment,
courts often based attorneys’ fees on the aggregate face value of coupons distributed (their nominal value), not their redemption rate
40
(their real value). This tendency meant that counsel often earned
much more than 25% of the recovery. For example, a fee award of
$150 million amounts to 15% of a $1 billion settlement if class members actually use the coupons the settlement awarded them. But if
class members redeem only 10% of the coupons, a $150 million fee
41
award represents 64% of the settlement’s real value.
In the years leading to CAFA’s passage, the class action weathered
significant criticism due to the great imbalance between the often
worthless coupons that class members received and the sizeable fees
their attorneys reaped. From the very first congressional hearing on
42
the bill to the last days of debate in the Senate and the House eight
ing: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE
L.J. 2053, 2064-65 (1995) (noting that many of the constraints clients place on lawyers
are not typically present in the class action context).
38
E.g., Stephen Labaton, Senate Approves Measure to Curb Big Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2005, at A1 (quoting Charles Grassley, chief sponsor of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 (CAFA) as critiquing “a class-action regime that many times serves no one but
the lawyers who bring these class action lawsuits”).
39
Fitzpatrick’s determination that the average fee award amounts to 25% of the
class’s recovery does not account for these settlements. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
811, 831 (2010) (acknowledging that a calculation of fee percentages does not reflect
“indefinite cash relief” or “noncash relief”).
40
Compare Christoper R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1059-60 (2002) (discussing how judges have been encouraged to believe that face value is equivalent to
true value), with THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CLASS ACTIONS: THE LAW OF 50 STATES
§ 9.03[1], at 9-39 to 9-40 (2005) (“In evaluating the merit of a non-cash settlement, the
only proper means of measuring true value is by estimating the actual redemption rate.”).
41
The numbers for this hypothetical are based on the settlement in Shaw v. Toshiba American Information Systems, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
42
Class Action Lawsuits: Examining Victim Compensation and Attorneys’ Fees: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3
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43

years later, the statute’s supporters invoked the large fees that ac44
companied worthless coupons as evidence of a “broken” system that
45
produced “outrageous decisions.” The corporate interests pushing
46
the bill disingenuously invoked the issue for helpful political cover.
As enacted, CAFA began with an ironically named “Consumer Bill of
Rights,” which included a provision meant to link attorney compensa47
tion to actual class member recovery, even as its central provisions
were intended to weaken class actions brought to enforce consumer
48
and other state law protections.
To the extent that the votes a bill wins are a window into social legitimacy, the strong bipartisan support that CAFA enjoyed suggested
49
some problems along these lines for the class action. Fitzpatrick’s
proposal would result in settlements with no pretense of class member
compensation and thus risks an even greater threat to the class action’s health than that posed by coupon settlements. To an extent, he
recognizes these dangerous shoals, conceding that “it would be politi50
cally difficult” to implement his proposal. Such a backlash might be
thought to reflect a failure to appreciate the utilitarian realities Fitzpatrick describes. Alternatively, taken as communicating something
about what legitimates the class action, the backlash might gesture toward an alternative normative source that can justify some class action
requirements that resist a cost-benefit rationale.
The bounds of this Response do not permit a thorough exploration of social legitimacy as a normative principle for aggregate litiga(1997) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
43
See 151 CONG. REC. S1235 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions)
(expressing concern over the role of plaintiffs’ attorneys in shaping settlement terms);
see also 151 CONG. REC. H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2010) (statement of Rep. Boucher)
(discussing the gap between fees and actual plaintiff recoveries).
44
151 CONG. REC. H737 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2010) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
45
151 CONG. REC. S1226 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter).
46
Cf. Class Action Fairness Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1115 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 33 (2003) (statement of Brian Wolfman, Staff Att’y, Public
Citizen Litigation Group) (“[T]he corporate community’s use of stories about coupon
settlements to drive the class action debate drips with irony . . . . [D]efendants love
coupon settlements . . . .”).
47
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006); see also Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL.
L. REV. 1695, 1698-705 (2006) (critiquing CAFA’s coupon-settlement provisions).
48
See, e.g., David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1252 (2007) (commenting on the federal courts’ hostility to state-law causes of action that led to the drafting
of CAFA).
49
The Senate passed CAFA by a vote of 72–26, and the House by a vote of 279–149.
50
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2075.
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tion. I can only suggest how it might justify the current fee practices
Fitzpatrick finds unprincipled. The individual action, based in the
“deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day
51
in court,” enjoys such a solid foundation of social legitimacy that, at
52
least presently, American law only grudgingly permits deviations
53
from this ideal. Sometimes, as with small-stakes class suits, individual
control over claims has to yield to practical realities. But this departure is disquieting. Mechanisms that preserve, to the extent possible,
the individual-action ideal without unduly compromising the practical
benefits of claim aggregation act as a corrective of sorts. Hence an attempt to let class members at least know that they are plaintiffs (individual notice), a device to preserve at least a modicum of individual
control over claims (opt-out rights), and the fiction that an injured
party, as in an individual action, initiated the suit (the named plaintiff
requirement).
If mechanisms to mitigate the deviation from the individual action
ideal help entrench the social legitimacy of the class action, then the
tendency to award 25% of the class’s recovery to counsel is not unprincipled but makes ample sense. This fee schedule roughly approximates what one might expect in an individually negotiated, contingency fee representation agreement. If it saddles class litigation with
costs-–a set of particularly small class suits that do not get filed–perhaps, like individual notice and opt-out rights, it also promises certain legitimacy benefits that in the end strengthen the overall vitality
of the class action. Even a utilitarian, I would think, might find this
result attractive.
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51

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty.,
517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
52
Cf. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 209-18 (1992) (discussing the demise of traditional “interest representation” practice during the twentieth century).
53
See Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 893-95 (discussing six exceptions to the general rule of
nonparty preclusion).

